Police strategies to reduce illegal possession and carrying of firearms: effects on gun crime by Koper, Christopher S. et al.
  
Campbell Systematic Reviews 
2012:11 
First published:  1 September, 2012 
Last updated:  June, 2012 
Search executed:  2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Police strategies to reduce 
illegal possession and 
carrying of firearms: effects 
on gun crime 
 
Christopher S. Koper, Evan Mayo-Wilson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Colophon 
 
Title  Police strategies to reduce illegal possession and carrying of firearms: effects 
on gun crime 
Institution  The Campbell Collaboration 
Authors  Koper, Christopher S 
Mayo-Wilson, Evan 
Smith, John 
DOI  10.4073/csr.2012.11 
No. of pages  53 
Last updated  June, 2012 
Citation  Koper CS, Mayo-Wilson E. Police strategies to reduce illegal possession and 
carrying of firearms: effects on gun crime. 
Campbell Systematic Reviews 2012:11 
DOI: 10.4073/csr.2012.11 
Copyright  © Koper et al. 
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are 
credited.[delete if co-registered] 
ISSN  1891-1803 
Co-registration  None 
Contributions  The authors thank Daniel J. Woods and Shannon McFadden for research 
assistance. They also thank David Wilson, David Weisburd, and external 
referees for the Campbell Collaboration for helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this manuscript. 
Editors for  
this review 
Editor: David Wilson 
Managing editor: Charlotte Gill 
Support/funding  This research was supported by grant 2004-DD-BX-0003 from the National 
Institute of Justice (Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice) 
to the University of Pennsylvania, by funding from the Campbell 
Collaboration and the Jerry Lee Center of Criminology (University of 
Pennsylvania), and by funding from the National Policing Improvement 
Agency (NPIA) of the United Kingdom (through subcontract to George 
Mason University and the Police Executive Research Forum). 
Corresponding 
author  
 
 Christopher S. Koper 
George Mason University,  
4400 University Drive, MS 6D12,  
Fairfax, Virginia 22030. 
USA 
Phone: (703) 993-4982 
E-mail: ckoper2@gmu.edu 
 
  
 Campbell Systematic Reviews 
 
Editors-in-Chief  Mark W. Lipsey, Vanderbilt University, USA 
Arild Bjørndal, The Centre for Child and Adolescent Mental Health, Eastern 
and Southern Norway & University of Oslo, Norway 
Editors   
Crime and Justice  David B. Wilson, George Mason University, USA 
Education  Sandra Wilson, Vanderbilt University, USA 
Social Welfare  William Turner, University of Bristol, UK 
Geraldine Macdonald, Queen’s University, UK & Cochrane Developmental, 
Psychosocial and Learning Problems Group 
International 
Development 
 Birte Snilstveit, 3ie, UK 
Hugh Waddington, 3ie, UK 
Managing Editor   Karianne Thune Hammerstrøm, The Campbell Collaboration 
Editorial Board   
Crime and Justice  David B. Wilson, George Mason University, USA  
Martin Killias, University of Zurich, Switzerland 
Education  Paul Connolly, Queen's University, UK 
Gary W. Ritter, University of Arkansas, USA 
Social Welfare  Aron Shlonsky, University of Toronto, Canada 
Jane Barlow, University of Warwick, UK 
International 
Development 
 Peter Tugwell, University of Ottawa, Canada 
Howard White, 3ie, India 
Methods  Therese Pigott, Loyola University, USA 
Ian Shemilt, University of Cambridge, UK 
  The Campbell Collaboration (C2) was founded on the principle that 
systematic reviews on the effects of interventions will inform and help 
improve policy and services. C2 offers editorial and methodological support to 
review authors throughout the process of producing a systematic review. A 
number of C2's editors, librarians, methodologists and external peer-
reviewers contribute. 
  The Campbell Collaboration    
P.O. Box 7004 St. Olavs plass 
0130 Oslo, Norway 
www.campbellcollaboration.org 
 
 
 
 
 3   The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
 
Table of contents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/ABSTRACT 5 
Background 5 
Objectives 5 
Criteria for inclusion of studies 5 
Search strategy 6 
Data collection and analysis 6 
Main results 6 
1 INTRODUCTION 7 
2 BACKGROUND: LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES FOR 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 8 
3 METHODOLOGY 10 
3.1 Criteria for inclusion of studies 10 
3.2 Search strategy 11 
3.3 Data management and extraction 13 
3.4 Data Synthesis 13 
4 LITERATURE SEARCH RESULTS 14 
5 NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT OF STUDIES 17 
5.1 Kansas City 17 
5.2 Indianapolis 20 
5.3 Pittsburgh 24 
5.4 Colombia (Cali and Bogota) 26 
6 SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS 29 
6.1 Key outcomes across studies 29 
6.2 Assessing differences in outcomes across studies 30 
7 DISCUSSION 33 
7.1 Summary and caveats 33 
7.2 Methodological limitations 33 
7.3 External validity 34 
7.4 Implementation and intermediate outcomes 34 
 4   The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
 
7.5 Crime displacement 35 
7.6 Future directions 35 
8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 37 
9 STUDIES INCLUDED IN REVIEW 38 
10 REFERENCES 40 
11 TABLES AND FIGURES 49 
 
 
 5   The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
 
Executive summary/Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Criminal misuse of firearms is among the world’s most serious crime problems. 
Strategies to reduce gun violence include efforts to restrict the manufacture and sale 
of firearms, interrupt the illegal supply of guns, deter gun possession, reduce gun 
carrying in public places, toughen responses to illegal gun use, reduce demand for 
firearms, promote responsible ownership of guns, and address community 
conditions that foster gun crime. In this review, we examine research on the 
effectiveness of selected law enforcement strategies for reducing gun crime and gun 
violence. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
This review examines the impacts of police strategies to reduce illegal possession 
and carrying of firearms on gun crime. Examples include gun detection patrols in 
high-crime areas, enhanced surveillance of probationers and parolees, weapon 
reporting hotlines, consent searches, and other similar tactics. 
 
CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF STUDIES 
Studies using randomized designs or quasi-experimental designs involving a non-
intervention condition were eligible for inclusion. Eligible studies had to include pre 
and post-intervention measurements of the outcome measure(s) for an intervention 
area(s) or group(s) and at least one comparison area or group without the 
intervention. However, we also included studies involving repeated interventions 
with one group or area in which the intervention and comparison units consisted of 
samples of time with and without the intervention. Eligible studies also had to 
measure gun-related crime (e.g., gun murders, shootings, gun robberies, gun 
assaults). The review does not include studies in which eligible interventions were 
implemented simultaneously with other new crime-reduction efforts. 
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SEARCH STRATEGY 
We searched 11 national and international databases for published and unpublished 
literature available through the end of 2009; examined 25 reviews and compilations 
of research on policing, gun control, and violence reduction; and searched the 
websites of five prominent police and criminal justice organizations in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Four studies met the inclusion criteria, reporting a 
total of 7 non-randomized tests of directed patrols focused on gun carrying in three 
American cities (5 tests) and two Colombian cities (2 tests). 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
From each included study, we extracted data pertaining to research design, subject 
characteristics, intervention(s), and outcome measure(s). We present a detailed 
narrative assessment of each included study, followed by a qualitative and 
quantitative synthesis of key features and results across studies. Our synthesis does 
not include a statistical meta-analysis of the results due to variability in the study 
designs and problems in computing a usable standardized effect size index for the 
studies. 
 
MAIN RESULTS 
Six of the seven tests (not all of which were independent) suggest that directed 
patrols reduced gun crime in high-crime places at high-risk times. The Colombian 
studies, which were based on before and after changes from repeated interventions 
measured at the city level, estimated that crackdowns on gun carrying reduced 
firearm homicides 10% to 15%. Estimated effects were generally larger and more 
variable in the American studies, which examined before and after changes in 
smaller target areas (beats or patrol zones) relative to changes in comparison areas. 
With one exception, the American studies found that gun crime declined by 29% to 
71%, depending on the outcome measures and statistical techniques used. 
Authors’ Conclusions: These studies suggest that directed patrols focused on illegal 
gun carrying prevent gun crimes. However, conclusions and generalizations must be 
qualified based on the small number of studies, variability in study design and 
analytic strategy across the studies, pre-intervention differences between 
intervention and comparison areas, and limited data regarding factors such as 
implementation, crime displacement, and long-term impact. There is also a strong 
need for rigorous study of other strategies to reduce illegal possession and carrying 
of firearms. 
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1 Introduction  
Criminal misuse of firearms is among the world’s most serious crime problems. In 
the United States, for example, there were nearly 10,000 murders with firearms in 
2010 (calculated from Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr) and another 338,000 non-fatal violent 
crimes with guns (Truman, 2011). Violent crimes with guns are about 3 times as 
likely to be deadly as crimes committed with knives and nearly 44 times as likely to 
be deadly as crimes involving no weapons (Alba and Messner 1995, pp. 397-402; 
also see Cook 1991; Zimring 1968). The prevalence of guns may contribute to 
particularly high levels of homicide in the United States (e.g., Hoskins 2001; 
Zimring and Hawkins 1997), where some estimates imply that the total costs of gun 
violence–including medical, criminal justice, and other costs–could be well over 
$100 billion per year (calculated from Cohen et al. 2004; also see Cook and Ludwig 
2000). 
 
Nations such as Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa have firearm homicide 
rates that exceed those of the United States (Krug et al. 1998; United Nations 1997; 
Villaveces et al. 2000). Guns are also involved in roughly a quarter to a third of 
homicides in a number of countries not known for having serious gun violence 
problems, including Canada, France, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, and New 
Zealand (calculated from Fingerhut et al. 1998, p. 18). In England and Wales, where 
gun possession is strictly regulated relative to the United States, crimes with 
firearms have roughly doubled since the late 1990s (Kaiza 2008). 
 
Strategies for reducing gun violence range from restrictions on the manufacture and 
sale of firearms to educational efforts that promote safe storage and use of firearms 
or discourage firearm ownership. In this paper, we review research on the 
effectiveness of law enforcement strategies for reducing gun crime and gun violence 
through reducing illegal gun possession and carrying. 
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2 Background: law enforcement 
strategies for reducing gun 
violence 
Strategies to reduce gun violence may attempt to interrupt the illegal supply of guns, 
deter gun possession, reduce gun carrying in public places, toughen responses to 
illegal gun use, reduce demand for firearms, promote responsible ownership of guns, 
and address community conditions that foster gun crime (e.g., see Center to Prevent 
Handgun Violence 1998; Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
1999). Law enforcement agencies are integral in all of these domains. 
 
Police typically handle gun crimes reactively, investigating violent gun crimes and 
making arrests for illegal possession or carrying when they encounter violations 
during routine activities (such as answering calls for service). To varying degrees, 
police also use proactive strategies to emphasize the targeting of gun crime. Among 
others, these include: disrupting the illegal supply of firearms through investigation 
of illicit gun trafficking, gun theft, and suspicious activities by retail gun dealers; 
focusing intensive investigative and enforcement activities on violent gun offenders 
and people at high-risk for gun violence (such as gang members and career gun 
offenders); implementing educational and preventive activities in conjunction with 
schools and other community groups (e.g., teaching students about gun safety) and 
collaborating with other criminal justice, government, and community organizations 
on comprehensive initiatives that combine various enforcement, prosecutorial, and 
prevention activities. 
 
This review examines evidence for law enforcement strategies that aim to reduce 
illegal gun possession and carrying through gun detection patrols in high-crime 
areas, enhanced surveillance of probationers and parolees, weapon reporting 
hotlines, consent searches, and other tactics. In the United States, gun possession is 
common among persons prohibited from lawful gun ownership, including those 
with prior convictions for serious crimes. Nationally, over 80% of incarcerated gun 
offenders appear to have possessed guns illegally prior to confinement; more than a 
third were already on probation or parole when they were arrested for a gun crime 
(Harlow 2001, p.10). Studies of murderers in some U.S. cities have revealed similar 
patterns (Kennedy et al. 1996; Moran 2006; Tierney et al. 2001). 
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Many juveniles (i.e., those under the age of 18) also possess guns in the United 
States despite various legal restrictions on their access to firearms. A survey of 
incarcerated juvenile offenders and inner city high school students in four states 
during the 1990s, for example, found that 83% of the inmates possessed guns prior 
to confinement, as did 22% of the students (Sheley and Wright 1993, p.4). Persons 
under the age of 18 committed nearly 10% of gun murders in the United States from 
2000 through 2005 (calculated from Fox and Zawitz 2007). 
 
Carrying of firearms is central to the commission of gun crimes in public locations, 
which is where many violent and predatory crimes occur. Almost all gun robberies, 
for example, are likely to involve gun carrying. In the U.S. city of Philadelphia, 76% 
of homicides from 1996 through 1999 occurred in a non-residential location and 
80% were committed with guns; this implies that many if not most homicides were 
committed by offenders carrying firearms in public places (Tierney et al. 2001). 
Despite legal restrictions on gun carrying, survey evidence suggests that roughly 
one-third to one-half of serious adult and juvenile offenders in the United States 
carry guns regularly for defense and to be prepared for criminal opportunities 
(Sheley and Wright 1993, p.5; Wright and Rossi 1986, pp.99-102). For all of these 
reasons, police strategies to reduce illegal possession and carrying of firearms are 
important to the prevention of gun violence. 
 
This review is not the first to examine the impacts of police crackdowns on illegal 
gun carrying. Other assessments of studies in this area have been conducted by the 
National Research Council (NRC) in the United States (NRC 2005), Sherman (1997), 
and Sherman and Eck (2002). This paper expands on these earlier efforts by 
systematically reviewing and updating the literature, by examining studies in greater 
detail than have earlier reviews, by incorporating research from outside the United 
States, and by considering strategies other than directed patrols for reducing illegal 
gun possession and carrying (e.g., enhanced monitoring of probationers and 
parolees and consent searches of at-risk youth). 
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3 Methodology 
Our review was conducted using systematic methods (e.g., see Farrington and 
Petrosino 2001) as required for Campbell Collaboration reviews, and an earlier 
version (which was done independently by the authors and not reviewed by the 
Campbell Collaboration) has been published elsewhere (Koper and Mayo-Wilson 
2006). In the sections below, we discuss our criteria for selecting studies, our search 
strategy, and our methods for data collection and synthesis1
 
. 
3.1  CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF STUDIES 
3.1.1  Types of interventions 
This review sought to examine evidence on a range of police interventions to reduce 
the illegal possession and carrying of firearms, including: directed or saturation 
patrols; roadblock checkpoints; enhanced monitoring of probationers, parolees, and 
other suspected gun offenders; use of new gun (and gunshot) detection technologies 
(such as portable, magnetic gun detection devices)2
 
; weapon reporting hotlines; 
searches of school lockers; and zero tolerance/crackdown initiatives. In order to 
make comparisons, interventions had to represent departures from normal practice 
(e.g., instituting new gun detection patrols). 
To isolate the effects of these tactics, the review does not include studies in which 
these interventions were implemented simultaneously with other new crime-
reduction efforts, whether by police or other organizations (e.g., Braga et al. 2001; 
Tita et al. 2003). Further, because the review emphasizes police action, we excluded 
legislative, prosecutorial, and judicial initiatives to enhance penalties for gun 
possession and carrying (i.e., efforts to increase the severity of punishment for these 
                                                        
1 The research protocol is also described in Koper (2003). 
2 A related intervention is the installation of metal detectors in places like airports, schools, and 
government buildings. Although the use of metal detectors is intended to discourage weapon carrying, 
it is arguably a form of target-hardening with limited applicability to general police work, particularly 
the reduction of street crime. Consequently, the review does not include studies of fixed metal 
detectors. 
3 For instance, the review does not include evaluations of the U.S. government’s Project Safe 2 A related interv ntion is th  installation of met l detectors in places like airports, schools, and 
government buildings. Although the use of metal detectors is intended to discourage weapon carrying, 
it is arguably a form of target-hardening with limited applicability to general police work, particularly 
the reduction of street crime. Consequently, the review does not include studies of fixed metal 
detectors. 
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offenses).3
3.1.2 Study design 
 Finally, the review does not include studies of gun buy-back programs 
(e.g., Plotkin 1996). Although these programs encourage illegal gun possessors to 
relinquish their firearms, they function more broadly as supply-side efforts to reduce 
the availability of guns in high-risk areas (e.g., see NRC 2005, pp. 95-96). 
Studies using randomized designs or quasi-experimental designs involving a non-
intervention condition were eligible for inclusion. These designs present fewer 
threats to a study’s internal validity than do other methods of assessing the effects of 
interventions, such as correlational studies or before and after comparisons. Eligible 
studies had to include pre and post-intervention measurements of the outcome 
measure(s) for an intervention area(s) or group(s) and at least one comparison area 
or group without the intervention. We also included studies involving repeated 
interventions with one group or area in which the intervention and comparison units 
consisted of samples of time with and without the intervention (the time-equivalent 
samples design) (Campbell and Stanley 1966). Studies not utilizing random 
assignment had to have comparison units of the same type. If the comparison and 
intervention units were not matched (e.g., using pre-intervention crime rates), the 
studies had to include statistical controls to account for crime-related differences in 
the units.4
 
 
3.1.3 Outcome measures 
Eligible studies had to measure gun-related crime (e.g., gun murders, shootings, gun 
robberies, gun assaults). Arrests for illegal possession and carrying of guns were not 
analyzed as outcomes because they were considered measures of program 
implementation.5
 
 
3.2  SEARCH STRATEGY 
The following 11 national and international databases were searched for published 
and unpublished literature available through 2009. 
 
                                                        
3 For instance, the review does not include evaluations of the U.S. government’s Project Safe 
Neighborhoods program or other similar programs in the United States (such as Project Exile) that 
have emphasized federal prosecution as a means to enhance penalties for gun offenders (McGarrell et 
al. 2009; Raphael and Ludwig 2003; Rosenfeld et al. 2005). Other examples include studies of the 
Bartley-Fox gun carrying law that raised penalties for illegal gun carrying in Massachusetts in the mid-
1970s (Deutsch and Alt 1977; Pierce and Bowers 1981) and studies of gun courts (Gendreau and 
Surridge 1978; Sheppard and Kelly 2002). 
4 Statistical controls could include multivariate regressions controlling for factors related to crime (e.g., 
demographic and other socioeconomic characteristics of the areas) or other methods adjusting for 
different crime levels and trends in the intervention and comparison areas. 
5 Studies that examined “weapons” or “armed” offenses without separate consideration of gun offenses 
were not included in the review since it is conceivable that a police intervention could reduce non-gun 
weapon offenses without reducing gun offenses. 
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•  Criminal Justice Abstracts 
•  National Criminal Justice Reference Service Abstracts Database 
•  Criminal Justice Periodicals Index 
•  Sociological Abstracts 
•  Econlit 
•  Medline 
•  Dissertation Abstracts 
•  Catalog of U.S. Government Publications 
•  Policyfile 
•  Public Affairs Information Service International 
•  Educational Resources Information Clearinghouse 
 
These databases were searched for the combination of terms on police (i.e., police, 
policing, or law enforcement) and firearms (i.e., firearm or gun).6
 
 
In addition, searches were conducted on the websites of five prominent police 
and criminal justice organizations in the United States and the United Kingdom: 
the Police Executive Research Forum, the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (U.S. Department of 
Justice), the Justice Research and Statistics Association, and the National 
Policing Improvement Agency of the United Kingdom. The Justice Research and 
Statistics Association maintains a database of reports by crime and justice 
statistical analysis centers operated (or funded) by state governments 
throughout the United States. The National Policing Improvement Agency of the 
United Kingdom has an online catalog with an extensive collection of books, 
reports, and journal articles from the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The other 
named organizations have searchable catalogs of their own reports and 
publications. Finally, 25 reviews and compilations of research on policing, gun 
control, and violence reduction were examined (Braga 2004, 2007; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 2003; Center to Prevent Handgun Violence 
1998; Cook and Moore 1995; Dedel 2007; Eck and Maguire 2000; Harcourt 
2003; Jacobs 2002; Kleck 1997; Lum et al. 2011; Ludwig and Cook 2003; 
National Institutes of Health 2004; NRC 2004, 2005; Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention 1999; Reiss and Roth 1993; Scott 2003; Sherman 
1990, 1992, 1997, 2001; Sherman and Eck 2002; Wintemute 2000; Wright et al. 
1983). The senior author conducted or supervised all searches (a research 
                                                        
6 For Criminal Justice Periodicals, it was also necessary to add terms such as “evaluation”, “study”, and 
“experiment” to screen out thousands of hits that were not evaluation studies. In conjunction with 
another project involving one of the authors (Lum et al. 2011), we also searched all but one of these 
databases (Educational Resources Information Clearinghouse) from 2000 through 2009 for any 
experimental or quasi-experimental studies looking at the impact of police on crime. This was done by 
searching for entries with terms for both policing and evaluation (e.g., evaluation and experiment). 
This second set of searches yielded no additional eligible studies, thus providing some external 
validation for the first set of searches. The authors thank Cynthia Lum and Cody Telep of George 
Mason University for assistance with the second set of searches 
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assistant provided support in the searching of literature databases) and screened 
studies for eligibility. 
3.3  DATA MANAGEMENT AND EXTRACTION 
From each included study, both authors independently extracted data pertaining 
to research design, subject characteristics, intervention(s), and outcome 
measure(s). Differences in their coding were resolved through discussion as 
needed. Tables 1 through 3 summarize these features. 
 
3.4  DATA SYNTHESIS 
We present a detailed narrative assessment of each included study, followed by a 
qualitative and quantitative synthesis of key features and results across studies. 
However, our synthesis does not include a statistical meta-analysis of the results 
for reasons considered in Section 6. 
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4 Literature search results  
Our search identified 25 studies—none of which were randomized trials—that 
described or evaluated eligible strategies. Seven of these studies were excluded 
due to the lack of an outcome evaluation. Another 14 were excluded based on the 
criteria for study design and outcome measures and/or the inclusion of ineligible 
program components (the effects of which could not be distinguished from those 
of eligible components).7 Studies meeting the review criteria included four non-
randomized evaluations testing police crackdowns on gun carrying in three U.S. 
cities—Kansas City, Missouri (Sherman and Rogan 1995; also see Shaw 1994, 
1995; Sherman et al. 1995), Indianapolis, Indiana (McGarrell et al. 2000; also 
see McGarrell et al. 2001, 2002), and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Cohen and 
Ludwig 2003)—and two Colombian cities—Cali and Bogota (Villaveces et al. 
2000). All of the studies examined directed patrols, which involve assigning 
additional officers to high-crime areas at high-risk times and allowing them to 
focus on proactive investigation and enforcement (e.g., intensified traffic 
enforcement and field interrogations of suspicious persons) rather than answer 
calls for service (McGarrell et al. 2001, p. 120).8
 
 
Police and researchers have long recognized that crime is concentrated in particular 
neighborhoods within cities (e.g., Shaw and McKay 1942).9
                                                        
7 Examples of excluded studies include: a non-experimental, correlational study of weapons arrests and 
gun homicides in New York City (Fagan and Davies 2003); a study describing national trends in 
homicides and arrests for possession and carrying of weapons in the United States (Sherman 2000); a 
process evaluation that described a St. Louis program to search the homes of juveniles suspected of 
having firearms (Decker and Rosenfeld 2004); a study of probationer surveillance and shootings in 
Wilmington, Delaware that did not have a comparison group/area (Delaware Statistical Analysis Center 
1998); a study of crackdowns on gang crime hot spots in Detroit that also included non-eligible 
program components (Bynum and Varano 2003); and a series of studies on gun suppression efforts 
conducted through the Youth Firearms Violence Initiative, a program conducted in a number of U.S. 
cities, that did not have appropriate or adequately defined comparison areas (some had other features 
also contributing to ineligibility) (Bynum et al. 1998; Conly et al. 1998; Cordner et al. 1998; Decker et 
al. 1998; also see Dunworth 2000). 
 For example, the 
intervention areas in the studies conducted in Kansas City and Indianapolis were 
relatively small areas of 0.6 to 2.8 square miles with 4,000 to 17,000 persons and 
homicide rates 7 to 20 times the national average. The two intervention areas in 
8 For a more general assessment of the effects of directed patrol on crime, see Sherman and Eck 
(2002). 
9 These areas typically have high levels of poverty, family disruption, population density, residential 
instability, and racial segregation (Sampson 1995). 
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Indianapolis accounted for 19% of that city’s homicides in 1996 while having only 
8% of its population. Within such areas, crime is further concentrated in particular 
street blocks, addresses, and intersections that are nodes for various business, 
leisure, and travel activities. In large U.S. cities, about 50% of crime occurs within 
less than 5% of the street blocks and addresses (e.g., Sherman et al. 1989; Weisburd 
et al. 2004). Crime also follows temporal patterns according to season, day of week, 
and time of day. Violent crime, for instance, tends to be higher in warm weather, on 
weekends, and during evening hours (e.g., Cohen and Ludwig 2003; Tierney et al. 
2001; Zawitz et al. 1993, p. 28). 
 
Several studies conducted during the last few decades suggest that greater numbers 
of police and higher levels of proactive patrol activity can reduce crime in high-risk 
areas and at high-risk times, thus enhancing police efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., 
Boydstun 1975; Sampson and Cohen 1988; Schnelle et al. 1977; Sherman and 
Weisburd 1995; also see reviews in NRC 2004; Sherman and Eck, 2002).10 In recent 
years, practitioners and researchers have increasingly emphasized directed patrols 
as a means to reduce gun crime in such contexts. In a 2009 survey of police agencies 
serving cities of 100,000 or more in the United States, over 40% reported using 
directed patrols or other specialized units emphasizing gun detection in hot spots on 
a frequent or regular basis and approximately one-third reported using them at least 
occasionally (Koper et al. 2012). In the studies reviewed here, officers sought to 
detect and deter illegal gun carrying—the suppression of which is thought to be a key 
mechanism for reducing gun crime at high-risk places and times—by enhancing 
their visibility and by initiating greater numbers of traffic stops and field 
interrogations.11
 
 
Two of the U.S. studies (Indianapolis and Pittsburgh) involved interventions in 
multiple locations (i.e., patrol areas). Combining these studies with the Kansas City 
and Colombian studies thus provides seven tests of the effects of directed patrols on 
gun crime.12
                                                        
10 This is thought to occur by raising offenders’ real and perceived risks of apprehension. 
 However, the tests were not all independent; two intervention areas in 
Indianapolis were compared to a single comparison area and two intervention areas 
in Pittsburgh were compared to the same comparison areas. The Colombian studies, 
in contrast, compared intervention and non-intervention periods in the same cities, 
adjusting for statistical differences between these periods. As described below, the 
studies differed considerably as a group in their units of analysis, intervention 
delivery, comparison groups, and statistical techniques.  
11 In many countries, police cannot stop vehicles and pedestrians on an arbitrary basis. In the United 
States, police can stop vehicles and persons when they observe traffic violations or other suspicious 
activities. Once this occurs, police may find other evidence that justifies a search: they may see guns or 
other contraband in plain view, find that the stopped person(s) is wanted for other crimes, or observe 
other signs (e.g., a motorist trying to hide something under the seat) that justify a search of the car 
and/or a frisk of the individual(s). In some cases, stopped motorists may consent to having their cars 
searched if asked by police. 
12 In Kansas City, the intervention occurred twice in the same area. As discussed below, however, the 
second intervention was not reported in sufficient detail to be counted as a separate test for this review. 
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No studies explicitly testing other police strategies for reducing illegal gun 
possession and carrying met the criteria for inclusion. However, the included studies 
used some of these tactics in addition to directed patrols; roadblock checkpoints 
were used in Bogota and Cali, enhanced monitoring of probationers occurred in one 
area in Indianapolis, and a weapon reporting hotline preceded the introduction of 
directed patrols in Kansas City. 
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5 Narrative assessment of 
studies 
Because the eligible studies are few in number and non-randomized, we first present 
a detailed narrative assessment of each study. In the subsections below, we 
summarize key aspects of the interventions, the study designs, and the results of the 
included studies, while also highlighting their methodological limitations. Overall, 
six of the seven tests presented in these studies produced evidence that directed 
patrols focused on guns reduce gun crime. (Unless stated otherwise, results 
described as statistically significant had two-tailed probability levels of 0.05 or less.) 
Conclusions and generalizations must be qualified, however, based on a number of 
considerations, including variability in the study designs and outcome measures 
across studies, potentially confounding differences between the intervention and 
comparison conditions, limited implementation data, and other methodological 
issues. Tables 1 through 3 summarize key features and results of the studies. 
 
5.1   KANSAS CITY 
5.1.1   Design 
From July 1992 through January 1993, police in Kansas City implemented evening 
gun patrols in a 0.6 square-mile patrol beat with 4,528 residents and a homicide rate 
roughly 20 times the national average (Sherman and Rogan 1995; see also Sherman 
et al. 1995). Changes in gun crime were examined during the 29 intervention weeks 
relative to the prior 29 weeks. The study also examined changes based on 52-week 
pre and post-intervention periods (the 52-week post-intervention period included 
the 29 intervention weeks and 23 weeks after the patrols ended). 
 
Changes in gun crime in the target area were contrasted with changes in a 
comparison area several miles away. Both areas had homicide rates many times the 
national average, had virtually identical numbers of drive-by shootings in 1991, and 
were overwhelmingly black. Moreover, the areas had similar gun crime trends 
during the three and a half years prior to the intervention: oscillating but generally 
stable levels from 1989 through the first half of 1991, followed by an upswing before 
the beginning of the intervention period. 
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However, the areas also differed in numerous ways. The comparison area was nearly 
twice the size of the target area (150 versus 80 square residential blocks) and had a 
lower population density (4,308 versus 7,075 residents per square mile), higher land 
values ($23,958 versus $14,181 median parcel value), and a better-educated 
population (73% versus 53% of adults with a high-school degree). Furthermore, 
although the areas had similar numbers of gun crimes, their rates differed 
substantially; relative to the target area, the comparison area had a 24% lower rate 
of homicide (1.4 versus 1.8 per 1,000 residents), a 40% lower rate of drive-by 
shootings (3.1 versus 5.3 per 1,000 residents), and a 23% lower rate of overall gun 
crime (31.0 versus 40.4 per 1,000 residents). (Table 1 highlights selected features of 
the areas.) 
5.1.2 Intervention 
Prior to the gun patrols, officers conducted a ten-week program of door-to-door 
visits in the target area, during which they informed residents of the upcoming 
crackdown on gun carrying and asked them to report gun offenders to an 
anonymous tips hotline. The hotline received only two calls. 
 
After the pre-intervention campaigns, patrols were done on 200 nights, usually by 
four officers in a pair of two-officer cars (see Table 2). Patrols involved a total of 
4,512 officer-hours, during which the officers were freed from answering radio calls 
and engaged in proactive gun detection via car and pedestrian stops. Officers issued 
1,090 traffic citations and made 948 car checks, 532 pedestrian checks, and 616 
arrests. In the process, officers seized 29 guns, which increased total gun seizures in 
the area by 65% over the prior six-month period. The authors reported that “regular 
policing activities” increased in the area by 260% (Sherman and Rogan 1995). 
5.1.3 Main results 
Total gun crimes–which consisted primarily of violent crimes with guns (i.e., 
robberies and assaults) but also included property crimes committed with guns 
(primarily destruction of property)–fell by 49% in the target area, from 169 in the 29 
weeks prior to the patrols to 86 during the 29-week intervention period (see Table 
3). This change was statistically significant in a t-test of weekly means. Similarly, an 
interrupted time series analysis based on the 52 weeks before the program and the 
52 weeks following the start of the program suggested a drop of 2.6 gun crimes per 
week (or about 44%) after controlling for temporal trends.13
                                                        
13 The times series estimate of 2.6 fewer gun crimes per week suggests a reduction of 44% relative to the 
trend-adjusted, pre-intervention level of 5.8 gun crimes per week (Sherman and Rogan 1995, p.686). 
This is similar to the unadjusted drop of 49% between the 29-week pre and post-intervention periods. 
Likewise, the time series estimates imply that the patrols prevented about 74 gun crimes during the 29-
week intervention period, which is comparable to the unadjusted drop of 83 gun crimes. 
 As reported below, 
there was some evidence that the patrols may have reduced homicides and drive-by 
shootings, but there were no reported changes in total crimes, overall violent or 
property crimes, or disorderly behavior. Substitution of crimes without firearms was 
not assessed. 
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Though gun seizures did decline in the comparison area, there were no statistically 
significant changes in gun seizures or gun crime in the comparison beat. Gun crime 
increased 4% (from 184 to 192) from the 29 pre-intervention weeks to the 29 
intervention weeks and declined by less than one gun crime per week (-.751) in the 
time series analysis of 52 pre-intervention and 52 post-intervention weeks. Direct 
statistical tests between the target and comparison areas were not reported. 
 
It is possible that the post-intervention change in the intervention area was an 
artifact of regression to the mean; the intervention followed the highest levels of 
crime in the five years for which data were reported. After the intervention, gun 
crime in the target area dropped to a level comparable to what it had been from 1989 
through mid-1991, raising the possibility that the evaluators missed a regression 
artifact by analyzing only the 29 and 52-week periods prior to the intervention. The 
fact that the crime drop in the target area coincided closely with the start of the 
intervention while no such regression occurred in the comparison area mitigates this 
concern to some degree, but it is hard to rule out a regression artifact in light of the 
short analysis period and the noted differences between the target and comparison 
areas. 
5.1.4 Other results 
To investigate geographic displacement of gun crime, the investigators used both t-
tests (for 29-week pre and post periods) and interrupted time series models (for 52-
week pre and post periods) to examine pre-post changes in the seven beats adjacent 
to the target beat, both individually and collectively (see Table 3). None of these 
beats experienced a statistically meaningful increase in gun crime. Collectively, the 
adjacent beats had a non-significant net increase of 52 gun crimes (7%) during the 
29 intervention weeks–which would not wholly offset a reduction of 83 in the target 
area–and a non-significant drop for the 52-weeks spanning the intervention and 
follow-up period. Further, the city as a whole had a 2% drop in gun crime during the 
29 intervention weeks, providing no obvious sign of displacement elsewhere. 
 
While not significant, the time series impact estimate for all contiguous areas 
(impact= -2.577, p>.05) was similar to the impact estimate for the target area 
(impact= -2.558, p<.05) and both were greater than the non-significant impact 
estimate for the comparison area (impact= -.751, p>.05). Further, impact estimates 
were negative for five of the seven surrounding areas, and two of the negative 
estimates were statistically significant. This could be interpreted as evidence of 
diffusion of benefits or as evidence that the area as a whole was on a downward 
trend. 
 
After a 5-month pause, the patrols were reintroduced from July 1993 to December 
1993. The evaluators reported that gun crime again declined in the target area while 
rising in the comparison area, though they did not present details regarding the 
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patrols or regarding crime trends during this second phase. In addition, contrasts of 
the two six-month intervention periods with all other half-year periods from 1991 
through 1993 suggested that the patrols reduced both homicides (based on chi-
square tests) and drive-by shootings (based on analysis of variance) in the target 
area while these crimes remained unchanged in the comparison area.14
Finally, surveys suggested that gun patrols had strong community support and had 
favorable impacts on residents’ perceptions of neighborhood conditions and fear of 
crime (Shaw 1995).
 
15
 
 
5.2  INDIANAPOLIS 
5.2.1 Design 
For 90 days during the latter part of 1997, police in Indianapolis implemented 
directed patrols in two target areas, each of which included two patrol beats 
(McGarrell et al. 2000, 2001, 2002). One target area in the east part of the city 
covered 1.7 square miles, with a primarily white and low-income population of about 
14,600 residents and a violent crime rate 96% higher than the citywide rate (38.4 
versus 19.6 per 1,000 residents) (see Table 1). Another target area in the north part 
of the city was a low-income area of about 16,600 residents, mostly black, and 2.8 
square miles with a violent crime rate 72% higher than the citywide rate (33.8 versus 
19.6 per 1,000 residents). Although pre-intervention crimes trends were not 
presented in detail, both areas appeared to have rising levels of violence. Violent 
crime rose 25% in the east area from early 1996 to early 1997 and 23% in the north 
area from early 1995 to early 1997 (McGarrell et al. 2000, Table 5-1). 
The project evaluation contrasted changes in crime in the target areas to those in a 
comparison area that did not receive gun patrols (and where gun seizures declined 
during the study period). The comparison area consisted of two patrol beats in the 
east part of the city that together covered 4.7 square miles with a largely black 
population of about 19,300 persons. However, the area’s violent crime rate was 33% 
to 41% lower than those of the respective target areas prior to the intervention. The 
population density in the comparison area (4,073 people per square mile) was much 
lower than the population density in either the east or north intervention areas 
(8,666 and 5,954 people per square mile, respectively). The comparison area was, 
therefore, more like the city as a whole than the target areas, which were relatively 
more violent and dense. 
                                                        
14 The change in drive-by shootings in the target area approached statistical significant (p<.1), while the 
change in homicides was significant (p<.05). Exact numbers were not reported, but a graphic 
illustration shown in Sherman and Rogan (1995, p. 688) suggests there were roughly seven to 15 drive-
by shootings semiannually when the gun patrols were not in operation and roughly two when the 
patrols were operating. The only reported figures for homicide indicate that the target area had four 
homicides semiannually during 1991. 
15 For this review, we concentrate on gun crime as the outcome of interest and do not review the 
attitudinal survey results in detail. The survey did not include measures of gun crime victimization. 
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It is not clear that the comparison area offers a reasonable counterfactual of what 
would have happened in the target areas had the patrols not been in effect. Gun 
crime was much lower in the comparison area than in the north area (pre-
intervention trends in the comparison area were not presented), and may have been 
low enough to create a floor effect; given the pre-intervention levels of crime, it is 
possible that the north area would appear to improve by comparison merely as a 
result of chance. To illustrate, the north target area had about six violent gun crimes 
per week (as measured by homicides, gun assaults, and armed robberies) during the 
90-day period one year prior to the intervention. The east target area had four per 
week, and the comparison area had only three per week. 
 
Gun crime was more comparable (in terms of numbers though not rates) in the east 
area and comparison area than in the north area and comparison area, and the east 
and comparison areas may have shared other similarities by virtue of their 
geographic proximity. However, they were very different demographically, and it is 
not clear if their pre-intervention crime trends were similar. Because the 
comparison area was not a particularly good match to the target areas, the authors 
also looked for changes in gun crime during the intervention period for the city 
overall (minus the target areas). Using time series analyses (described below), they 
found no significant changes. 
5.2.2 Intervention 
Officers implemented different styles of patrol in the two target areas (see Table 2). 
In the east target area, officers pursued a general deterrence strategy in which they 
sought to maximize traffic stops, thereby seizing more guns and creating a general 
sense of enhanced police presence. In the north area, officers made pedestrian and 
vehicle stops more selectively, utilizing a targeted offender approach that focused on 
particularly suspicious persons and vehicles. Officers in the north area also paired 
with probation officers to conduct home visits of probationers. During the 90-day 
intervention period, officers spent 2,905 hours patrolling the east/general 
deterrence area, making 3,826 vehicle stops and 558 arrests. In the north/targeted 
offender area, officers spent 1,975 hours on patrol, making 1,417 vehicle stops, 434 
arrests, and 126 probation checks.16
 
 
The gun patrols produced 12 illegal gun seizures in the north/targeted offender area 
and 13 illegal gun seizures in the east/general deterrence area, increasing total gun 
seizures 50% in the east/general deterrence area but by only 8% in the 
north/targeted offender area relative to the same 90-day period of the prior year.17
                                                        
16 No further details were provided on the specifics of the patrols, such as the number of officers and 
cars involved or the times of day when the patrols took place. 
 
Although gun seizures rose less (in percentage terms) in the north/targeted offender 
17 For most analyses, the evaluators contrasted the intervention period with the same 90-day period 
from the prior year rather than the 90 days just prior to the intervention in order to control for possible 
seasonal effects. Total gun seizures rose only modestly in the north/targeted offender area in part 
because routine gun seizures by patrol officers declined during the intervention period. 
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area than in the east/general deterrence area, there were more gun recoveries per 
officer-hour, per vehicle stop, and per pedestrian stop in the north area. Meanwhile, 
gun seizures fell 40% in the comparison area between these same periods (from 45 
to 27). 
5.2.3 Main results 
During the intervention period, total gun crime (undefined) dropped 29% in the 
north/targeted offender area relative to the same 90-day period of the prior year 
(from 75 to 53) (see Table 3).18
 
 In addition, gun assaults and armed robberies 
(including those with guns and other weapons) both declined about 40%, and 
homicides dropped from seven to one. In total, homicides, gun assaults, and 
armed robberies dropped 44%, from 78 to 44. Based on analysis of variance 
tests, the reductions in gun assaults and armed robberies were statistically 
significant relative to the comparison area, where gun and weapon offenses 
increased (see below) and homicides remained unchanged.  
In the east/general deterrence area, homicides dropped from four to zero, but 
other gun crimes rose. Contrasts of the east/general deterrence and comparison 
areas produced mixed and non-significant results. Total gun crimes, for 
example, increased 36% in the former but only 8% in the latter. On the other 
hand, total homicides, gun assaults, and armed robberies rose 22% in the 
east/general deterrence area (from 54 to 66) and 89% in the comparison area 
(from 38 to 72).19
 
 
The investigators supplemented these tests with interrupted time series analyses 
of weekly violent gun crimes (approximated by the sum of homicides, gun assaults, 
and armed robberies) in each area over a 158-week span covering the 132 weeks (i.e., 
two-and-a-half years) prior to the intervention, the 13 intervention weeks, and 13 
post-intervention weeks. Controlling for temporal trends, results suggested a 
statistically significant drop of nearly two gun crimes per week (-1.72) during the 
intervention in the north/targeted offender area (a result consistent with results in 
Kansas City), a statistically non-significant increase of 0.41 gun crimes per week in 
the east/general deterrence area, and a statistically significant increase of 1.46 gun 
crimes per week in the comparison area.20
                                                        
18 The investigators did not explicitly define the category of all gun crimes, so it is not clear if they 
included property offenses committed with a gun, as did the investigators in Kansas City. 
 The time series analyses suggest that gun 
19 The investigators also compared changes in the target areas to those in the rest of the city. This 
review generally focuses on results for the two-beat comparison area since it represents a unit more 
comparable to the target areas. It also focuses on the separate results for each intervention area rather 
than results combined across the intervention areas. 
20 Results were very similar whether defining the post-intervention period as the 13 intervention weeks 
or as the 13 intervention weeks plus the 13 weeks after the patrols ended. Time series estimates for the 
north/targeted activities area suggest that the patrols prevented 22 to 25 violent gun crimes during the 
13-week intervention period. This reduction cannot be expressed as a percentage because the authors 
did not present pre-intervention means for the full period covered by the time series analyses. 
However, there were 6 homicides, gun assaults, and armed robberies per week in the north/targeted 
activities area during the 90-day pre-intervention period defined earlier. Using this as an approximate 
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crime dropped in the north/targeted offender area and that the increase in the 
east/general deterrence area was due to normal variation or a pre-intervention 
trend.21
 
 
Taking the results at face value, the targeted offender gun patrols may have been 
successful but the general deterrence patrols appear to have made little difference. 
The targeted offender patrol style may have enabled officers to focus their attention 
more efficiently and effectively on people and places at highest risk for gun violence; 
however, one might question whether the patrol styles interacted with differences 
between the target areas in crime, racial composition, and other factors.22
5.2.4 Other results 
 
Focusing on other results from the north/targeted offender area, the gun patrols did 
not appear to affect violent crimes without firearms.23 Nor was there clear evidence 
of crime displacement or diffusion of benefits to nearby areas; collectively, the 
five patrol beats surrounding the north target area experienced a 10% increase in 
homicides, gun assaults, and armed robberies (relative to the same 90-day 
period of the prior year), which was statistically non-significant, spread across 
the areas, and too small to completely offset the corresponding reduction in the 
north/targeted activities area.24
 
 
Community surveys administered by the evaluators indicated that the initiative 
had a high level of public support, which may have been due in part to the efforts 
of police managers to emphasize professional and respectful treatment of 
citizens and to secure the support of neighborhood leaders prior to the 
intervention.25
                                                                                                                                                             
baseline, the time series results imply that the patrols reduced weapons violence in this area by 29% to 
32%. By comparison, the unadjusted drop in these crimes between the 90-day pre- and post-
intervention periods was 34, or 44%. 
 
21 Considering that violent crime had been rising for at least two years in the north area, there is 
perhaps some lingering concern about a regression artifact in that area. The time series analyses 
mitigate that problem for the study period (1995 through early 1998), though it is hard to completely 
rule out the possibility of a regression phenomenon over a longer period without additional data. 
22 A comparison of the intervention period to the 90 days just prior to the intervention showed that gun 
crime declined in the east area while rising in the comparison area. A very similar directed patrols 
initiative that did not emphasize guns to the same degree took place in the east area for two months in 
late 1995 and was subsequently maintained at a lower level. The investigators found no indication that 
the effects of this earlier intervention lasted beyond late 1995. 
23 Reductions in total aggravated assaults and robberies were smaller than those observed for gun 
assaults and armed robberies and were not clearly significant relative to changes in the comparison 
area (based on changes from the same 90-day period of the prior year). Further breakdowns show that 
the total number of assaults and robberies without guns in the north area remained the same (64) 
across the two periods (calculated from McGarrell et al. 2000, Tables 3-8 and 3-11). Also, burglaries 
rose by 20% in both target areas while declining 2% in the comparison area. 
24 Separate analyses of each adjacent beat reportedly provided very little evidence of increases or 
decreases in total homicides, aggravated assaults, robberies, burglaries, or vehicle thefts. 
25 For this review, we concentrate on gun crime as the outcome of interest and do not review the 
attitudinal survey results in detail. The survey did not include measures of gun crime victimization. 
However, one survey item suggested that the perception of shootings as a “major” problem went down 
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5.3  PITTSBURGH 
5.3.1 Design 
For 14 weeks spanning July 1998 to October 1998, police in Pittsburgh conducted 
evening gun patrols two nights a week in two of the city’s six patrol zones (Cohen 
and Ludwig 2003). Compared to the interventions tested in Kansas City and 
Indianapolis, this project was less intensive, involving fewer officer-hours spread 
over larger areas. The target patrol zones (zones 1 and 5) were both approximately 
ten square-miles with about 55,000 and 80,000 residents, respectively. These zones 
had the highest crime rates in the city and each had over a dozen neighborhoods that 
were described as diverse in their demographic characteristics and crime problems 
(see Table 1). 
 
The comparison areas were the city’s four remaining patrol zones. Relative to the 
target zones, the comparison zones were on average less dense (6,494 versus 7,312 
persons per square miles) and had a lower percentage of black residents (24.8% 
versus 38.8%), but they had comparable home ownership rates (47.1% versus 44.1% 
of residents owned their own homes) and poverty levels (23.3% versus 24.4% of 
residents were poor) (Cohen 2002, Exhibit 5).26
 
 
Given the relatively short study period (6 pre-intervention weeks and 14 
intervention weeks) and the large pre-intervention differences in crime between the 
intervention and comparison zones, regression artifacts and floor effects must be 
considered throughout the analyses. For example, daily gunshot injuries, one of the 
study’s primary outcome measures, were 187% higher in the target zones than in the 
comparison zones prior to the intervention (.155 versus .054). This difference was 
due to the Wednesday to Saturday portion of the week, which is when police 
conducted the intervention (as discussed below). Gun injuries averaged 0.028 per 
day for both intervention and comparison zones on Sunday through Tuesday, but 
from Wednesday to Saturday the target areas averaged 0.25 per day while the 
comparison areas averaged 0.073 per day. Hence, even a naturally occurring 
reduction in injuries (i.e. a regression artifact) would have been most likely to occur 
in the intervention zones on the intervention days. 
5.3.2 Intervention 
Gun patrols were conducted in the target areas during the Wednesday to Saturday 
portion of each week, though the specific days varied week-to-week and between 
zones (see Table 2). Five additional officers working in three cars patrolled the areas 
between 8 p.m. and midnight on the selected evenings. The patrols emphasized 
                                                                                                                                                             
in the intervention areas and increased in the comparison area (these changes were not statistically 
significant) (see McGarrell et al. 2000, Table 4-6). 
26 A sensitivity analysis suggested that differences were more pronounced between the target areas and 
the three comparison areas that did not include the patrol zone encompassing the central business 
district. 
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traffic stops and “stop and talk” contacts, reportedly using a mix of place-based and 
person-based targeting. In sum, 51 patrols were implemented across the two 
intervention areas for a total of nearly 1,000 officer-hours, increasing the usual 
number of officers by 50% in zone 1 and by 25% in zone 5. In addition to making 
over 200 contacts and 18 arrests (most of which occurred in zone 5), the officers 
seized seven guns (two in zone 1 and five in zone 5). It is not clear that gun seizures 
increased over normal levels. 
5.3.3 Main results 
An evaluation of the program compared changes in calls to an emergency dispatcher 
reporting “shots-fired” and hospital reports of assault-related gunshot injuries in the 
target zones to those in the city’s other patrol zones (see Table 3). Most analyses 
were based on daily time series data covering the six weeks prior to the intervention 
and the fourteen intervention weeks. This review counts the intervention in each 
area as a separate trial, but many of the analyses presented by the authors were 
based on results combined for the two target areas. 
 
Averaged across the target zones, shots-fired calls declined 0.066 per day (9%) and 
gunshot injuries declined 0.048 per day (31%) during the intervention. In contrast, 
shots-fired calls increased by 0.053 per day (19%) and gunshot injuries rose by 
0.026 per day (48%) in the other patrol zones. Changes in gunshot injuries were 
significantly different between the intervention and comparison areas, leading the 
authors to a differences-in-differences27
 
 estimate of 0.073 injuries prevented per 
day.  
The investigators also conducted a differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) 
analysis based on changes in gun crime during the program nights (Wednesday to 
Saturday) and non-program nights (Sunday to Tuesday) between areas.28 The 
authors argued that results averaged across the intervention areas suggested the 
patrols reduced shots-fired calls by 0.347 per day (34%, p<=.05) and gunshot 
injuries by 0.222 per day (71%, p<=.10) on the program days.29
                                                        
27 Estimates are calculated by subtracting the change in the comparison areas from the changes in the 
intervention area. 
 Separate DDD 
estimates for each target zone (see Table 3) suggest that both had significant 
reductions in shots-fired calls relative to the control zones, but only zone 5 
experienced a significant reduction in gunshot injuries (the authors reported that 
the proportional decline in gunshot injuries was similar in both zones). The authors 
also reported that gunshot injuries increased in zone 5 after the program ended. 
28 Comparing changes during the program and non-program nights in the intervention zones avoids 
the potentially confounding effect of differences between the intervention and comparison areas. 
Examining the same changes in the comparison areas controls for the possibility that the program and 
non-program days followed different trends throughout the city. 
29 Each estimated percentage decline is based on the estimate of crimes prevented divided by the sum 
of observed crimes and crimes prevented. 
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5.3.4 Other results 
These estimates may overstate the program’s impacts in a number of ways. The 
validity of the shots-fired measure was questionable; officers were unable to verify 
an incident in three out of every four calls. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis that 
substituted the program year data with data from the same calendar period of the 
year before the program (1997) also produced significant DDD estimates for shots-
fired calls (the authors referred to these estimates as “phantom program effects”). 
This strongly suggests the estimated drop in shots-fired incidents was due at least in 
part to a pre-intervention trend, a seasonal pattern, or chance. 
 
As discussed previously, regression artifacts and floor effects may have also 
influenced the gunshot injuries analysis. Indeed, the authors found a similar though 
smaller DDD “phantom” effect in Zone 5 by replacing the program year data with 
data from the same weeks of the year after the program (1999), during which the 
gun patrols were no longer in effect.30
 
 
Geographic and temporal displacements of crime are also a concern. As noted 
earlier, gunshot injuries decreased by 0.048 per day in the program areas but 
simultaneously increased by about half that value (0.026 per day) in the comparison 
areas. While injuries declined by 0.161 per day during the program days in the 
program areas, they rose by 0.103 per day on non-program days in these same areas. 
Similar patterns appeared in the shots-fired analyses. Therefore, it is possible that 
crime was displaced from the target areas to the comparison areas and/or that crime 
was displaced from intervention days to non-intervention days within the target 
areas. The former would have increased both the DD and DDD estimates of the 
patrols’ impact, and the latter would have increased the DDD estimates. 
 
5.4  COLOMBIA (CALI AND BOGOTA) 
5.4.1 Design 
The Colombian cities of Cali (1.8 million residents in 1994) and Bogota (5.6 million 
residents in 1996) implemented intermittent bans on all gun carrying at different 
times in the 1990s (Villaveces et al. 2000). During the early 1990s, these cities had 
overall homicide rates comparable to those of the highest crime areas of some 
American cities (see Table 1); together, they accounted for less than 20% of the 
                                                        
30 Another supplemental analysis suggested that accidental gunshot injuries declined in the target areas 
during the intervention period. This could also signify that the estimated program impact on assault-
related injuries was due in part to more general causes insofar as a link between gun patrols and 
accidental gun injuries is less intuitive than one between gun patrols and criminal gunshot injuries (the 
investigators also felt that the drop in accidental injuries was unrelated to the program). 
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population and nearly a third of homicides in Colombia, which had a homicide rate 
over nine times higher than that of the U.S. 31
 
 
An evaluation of these programs compared homicide rates during ban and non-ban 
days over multiple years in each city. The investigators refer to their study design as 
interrupted time series with multiple replications. While the design is most 
appropriate when the intervention is introduced randomly rather than on a regular 
basis (Campbell and Stanley 1966, pp. 43-46), which was not the case in this 
application, the study met all criteria for inclusion in this review. Because the bans 
were implemented primarily at high-risk times for homicide (e.g., weekends 
following paydays), the researchers used statistical adjustments (described below) to 
compensate for pre-existing differences between the intervention and non-
intervention days. 
5.4.2 Intervention 
The bans were implemented primarily on weekends following paydays, holidays, 
and election days (all of which were high-risk times for homicide) (see Table 2). 
However, bans were not established on all such days during the intervention periods 
and bans were not limited to just these days.32
 
 In Cali, bans were implemented on 34 
occasions for a total of 89 days spanning from November 1993 through 1994. In 
Bogota, there were 22 bans covering a total of 67 days during the following periods: 
December 1995 through March 1996; December 1996 through February 1997; and 
March 1997 through April 1997. Cali used the bans during a period of rising 
homicide rates, and Bogota employed them during a period of falling homicide rates 
and rapid population growth. 
The bans were advertised through the media and applied to all people, including 
those with permits to carry guns. Police enforced the bans through roadblock 
checkpoints (which were usually established in high-crime areas), searches during 
traffic and pedestrian stops, searches of patrons in bars, and other routine activities. 
33
                                                        
31 In 1994, Cali’s homicide rate was 124 per 100,000, while Bogota’s was 68 per 100,000. By way of 
comparison, the homicide rates in the Indianapolis north and east target areas in 1996 were 90 and 50 
per 100,000, respectively. 
 However, the study provided very little specific information about police activities. 
The evaluators reported that police in Cali recovered four guns per day during 
intervention times and 0.8 guns per day during non-intervention times. These 
figures seem remarkably low given Cali’s size and homicide rate, perhaps suggesting 
that police enforcement efforts were focused on relatively small areas of the city, 
enforcement efforts were modest, or efforts to advertise the bans were highly 
effective. No further implementation data were available for either city. Hence, the 
contexts, types, dosages, and durations of police activities are unclear. 
32 These deviations were not documented explicitly in the evaluation report. 
33 Some of the methods used are not legal in all countries, so inferences should be made cautiously. 
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5.4.3 Main results 
An evaluation of these programs compared homicide rates during ban and non-ban 
days in Cali from 1993 through 1994 and in Bogota from 1995 through August 1997 
(see Table 3). As noted above, the bans were generally implemented on days when 
homicides were most likely to occur. Despite the bans, the unadjusted homicide rate 
was higher on intervention days than on non-intervention days in both cities; Cali’s 
homicide rate was 51% higher on intervention days (161.8 versus 107.5 per 100,000 
person-years) and Bogota’s homicide rate was 37% higher on intervention days (81.3 
versus 59.3 per 100,000 person-years). In short, police were able to identify and 
implement bans at times that were considerably more violent than normal. 
 
To adjust for pre-existing differences between ban and non-ban days, the 
researchers stratified non-intervention days according to several temporal 
dimensions (such as type of day, time of day, and season) to estimate risk-adjusted, 
expected homicide rates for the intervention periods and compared these to 
homicide rates observed during intervention days. They also estimated negative 
binomial regression models controlling for the effects of time of week, payday 
weekends, holidays and election days, month of the year, and citywide time trends. 
Results were similar with both analytical methods. 
 
Based on regression analyses, the authors estimated that the bans reduced 
homicides 13% to 14% when they were in effect. In Bogota, the authors estimated 
that the bans had comparable effects on gun and non-gun homicides, reducing the 
former by 15% and the latter by 12%. In Cali, the estimated reductions were 23% for 
non-gun homicides and 10% for gun homicides, though the difference in these effect 
sizes was not statistically significant. 
5.4.4 Other results 
Evidence thus suggests that non-gun homicides also decreased during the bans. 
There was no measurable displacement of homicides to the seven-day periods 
immediately following each ban, but other patterns of temporal and geographic 
displacement were not examined. Consequently, the study may overstate the impact 
of the bans, particularly since they occurred on a regular rather than random basis 
and were advertised through the media, giving potential offenders a clear sense of 
when detection risks were greatest. Further, homicides actually rose 18% in Cali 
from 1993 to 1994 despite the use of the bans (the investigators did not explore 
whether this was an improvement over prior trends). 
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6 Synthesis of results 
6.1  KEY OUTCOMES ACROSS STUDIES 
To summarize, six of the seven tests presented in these studies suggest that the 
police crackdowns on gun carrying reduced gun crime. The estimated effects ranged 
from a 10% reduction in gun homicides in the city of Cali to a 71% reduction in 
gunshot victimizations in selected police zones of Pittsburgh. 
 
The Colombian studies, which were based on before and after changes from 
repeated interventions, estimated that crackdowns on gun carrying reduced firearm 
homicides 10% to 15% (based on regression estimates). Results from the two studies, 
which utilized the same statistical procedures and outcome measures, were 
statistically indistinguishable based on their confidence intervals. 
 
Estimated effects were generally larger and more variable in the American studies, 
which examined before and after changes in one or more target areas relative to 
changes in one or more comparison areas. The most similar of the American studies 
were conducted in Kansas City and Indianapolis. Gun crime dropped 29% to 49% in 
the successful trials in those cities. The Pittsburgh study, which involved larger and 
more diverse areas, lower intervention dosages, different outcome measures, a 
shorter time series, and different statistical techniques, suggested reductions in gun 
crime ranging from 34% (for shots fired calls) to 71% (for gunshot injuries) averaged 
over two target areas. Taken together, the American studies suggest that directed 
patrols reduced gun crime by roughly a third or more by most measures. The major 
exception to this pattern was the unsuccessful effort in the Indianapolis east target 
area where gun crime did not decline (though by some measures, this area improved 
relative to the comparison area). In the American studies, gun crime generally rose 
or remained unchanged in the comparison areas. 
 
Determining a standardized effect size from the American studies is problematic 
because the variability in the outcome measures is based on time rather than areas 
or people. Thus, for example, the size of a standardized mean difference calculated 
from these studies would vary for any given underlying effect depending on whether 
the time units (and hence the group sample sizes) were measured in terms of days, 
weeks, months, years, or some other measure of time (e.g., see Lipsey and Wilson 
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2001, pp. 48-50). For this reason, we did not conduct a statistical meta-analysis of 
the results from the American studies.34
 
 
However, to provide an informal summary of results across all of the studies, Figure 
1 presents before and after percentages changes in gun crime based on selected 
measures and analyses from each study. For this illustration, we attempted to focus 
on reasonably comparable outcome measures and on analyses that could be 
expressed in terms of before and after percentage changes for target areas and, if 
applicable, comparison areas. For the Kansas City study, we present the change in 
the weekly average of all gun crimes (primarily robberies and assaults with guns) for 
the main intervention period. The Indianapolis results in Figure 1 are based on 
changes in weapons violence (i.e., homicides, aggravated assaults with guns, and 
armed robbery) between the 90-day intervention period and the same 90-day period 
of the prior year. The Pittsburgh results represent changes in the daily average of 
assault-related gunshot injuries from the 6-week pre-intervention period to the 14-
week program period, averaged for the two target areas and the four comparison 
areas, respectively. Note that these are not the DDD estimates from the Pittsburgh 
study and that they were chosen to provide measures more comparable to those 
from the other studies [see Cohen and Ludwig 2003, p. 235).35 By this measure, the 
impact of gun patrols in the Pittsburgh target areas was substantial but smaller than 
that observed in Kansas City and Indianapolis north.36
 
 Finally, the estimates for Cali 
and Bogota are regression-adjusted estimates of the change in gun homicides during 
periods when the gun carrying bans were in effect. Based on these measures and 
analyses, the reductions in gun crime ranged from 10% to 15% in the Colombian 
studies and from 31% to 49% in the successful American trials (to maintain 
comparability between the estimates from the Colombian and American studies, 
estimates from the latter are based on pre-post changes in the target areas and have 
not been adjusted for increases in the comparison areas). 
6.2  ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN OUTCOMES ACROSS 
STUDIES 
Comparisons of effect sizes across the studies must be made very cautiously, as the 
studies differ notably in their contexts, units of analysis, intervention delivery, 
comparison groups, and statistical techniques to control for bias. Notwithstanding, 
one obvious contrast is that between the smaller effects in the Colombian studies 
                                                        
34 Meta-analysis commonly involves calculating standardized effect sizes for each study and averaging 
these measures across studies (Lipsey and Wilson 2001). 
35 We did not use the results for shots fired calls due to the validity problems reported with that 
measure. 
36 Note that the average before and after change that occurred in the Pittsburgh intervention areas 
during the portion of the week when the gun patrols were conducted (i.e., Wednesday to Saturday) was 
64% as opposed to the 31% change, shown in Figure 1, that is based on all days of the week (calculated 
from Cohen and Ludwig 2003, pp. 235). We focus on the latter, nonetheless, because it minimizes the 
potential impact of temporal displacement. 
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and the larger ones in the American studies. Differences in the types of areas studied 
may have been one key factor explaining this divergence. The American studies were 
based on city patrol areas with as few as 4,500 people. The Colombian studies, in 
contrast, were based on entire cities with millions of residents. Police may be able to 
raise apprehension risks (real and perceived) more successfully in small areas like a 
neighborhood than in larger areas like an entire city (e.g., see Sherman and 
Weisburd 1995). In this regard, it is also notable that the smallest effects in the 
American studies were those in Pittsburgh (when focusing on before and after 
changes in the target area), where the target areas were considerably larger than in 
Kansas City and Indianapolis. However, the smaller effect sizes in the Colombian 
studies may also reflect the larger base rates from which they were calculated; the 
bans did appear to prevent substantial numbers of gun homicides—roughly 79 in 
Cali and 149 in Bogota (calculated from Villaveces et al. 2000, p. 1208). Other 
potentially important differences between the American and Colombian studies that 
may explain differences in their results include legal and cultural differences, 
differences in implementation and tactics (including the fact that the Colombian 
bans were implemented only on selected and publicized days), differences in weapon 
availability, and differences in research design, outcome measures, and statistical 
techniques. 
 
Connecting effect sizes to intervention dosages and other implementation factors is 
difficult due to the small number of studies, the poor documentation of some efforts 
(particularly those in Colombia), and other differences in the types of analyses and 
areas involved.37
 
 Further, available activity measures often fail to capture potentially 
important differences in program delivery. In Kansas City, for example, officers 
reportedly spent only 27% of their time actually patrolling the target area. The 
remainder was spent processing arrests and “…performing other patrol-related 
duties, as well as in patrol work outside the target area” (Sherman and Rogan 1995). 
Complementary activities also differed among the trials. These activities included 
the probation/parole checks in Indianapolis (it was not reported if these resulted in 
gun seizures), the door-to-door citizen contacts in Kansas City (these sorts of 
contacts have been evaluated favorably as a policing strategy in other contexts—see 
Sherman and Eck 2002), and the media announcements in Colombia. How these 
activities affected the reported results is unclear. 
 
The most extensive and comparable of the studies are those done in Kansas City and 
Indianapolis, and the authors of the Indianapolis study made extensive comparisons 
of police effort in the Kansas City and Indianapolis target areas (McGarrell et al. 
2000, 2001). Standardizing officer-hours, arrests, and gun seizures by person-weeks 
and square-mile-weeks, the Kansas City intervention was most intensive, followed 
by Indianapolis east and Indianapolis north. Yet the apparent outcomes did not 
                                                        
37 The latter could include differences in various social characteristics across settings as well as 
differences in the types of penalties faced by violators. 
 32       The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
correspond to this ranking, as the reported reductions in gun crimes were greatest in 
Kansas City and Indianapolis north. Similarly, rates of gun detection were highest in 
the Kansas City and Indianapolis north trials; the Kansas City officers seized one 
gun per 156 officer-hours, and the Indianapolis north officers seized one per 165 
officer-hours. By contrast, in Indianapolis east officers seized one per 223. The 
authors of the Indianapolis report have suggested that the more patrols focus on 
high-risk places (as in Kansas City) and persons (as in Indianapolis north), the 
better the outcomes (McGarrell et al. 2000, 2001). 
 
The Pittsburgh and Colombian studies have little implementation data, but that 
which is available suggests that dosages were considerably lower in these studies, 
which may help to explain their lower effect sizes. In comparison to the Kansas City 
and Indianapolis efforts, Pittsburgh officers were spread over much larger areas, 
expended fewer hours, made fewer arrests, and seized fewer guns per week.38
 
 The 
Colombian bans were in effect for only two to three days at a time on average, and 
data from Cali suggested a low rate of gun seizures relative to the size and violence 
levels of the city. However, police efforts in Pittsburgh and Colombia may have been 
focused on smaller places within the study areas; if so, effects may have been greater 
(in percentage terms) in those targeted areas. 
In short, the results tentatively suggest that crackdowns on gun carrying are more 
effective and efficient when they are more intensive and focused on high-risk places, 
times, and people. While we cannot provide further precision to these results 
through qualitative assessment or meta-analysis, the evidence is generally consistent 
across studies, so there is little need to improve statistical power or reconcile 
conflicting results. 
 
                                                        
38 However, the Pittsburgh officers seem to have done a good job focusing their efforts within these 
larger areas; gun seizures per officer-hour were greater in the Pittsburgh target areas than in the 
Kansas City and Indianapolis north areas (see Table 3-1). 
 33       The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
7 Discussion 
7.1  SUMMARY AND CAVEATS 
Our systematic review of research on police strategies to reduce illegal gun 
possession and carrying revealed four studies with before and after control group or 
repeated interventions designs that have examined the impact of directed patrols 
focused on illegal gun carrying. In total, these studies contain seven tests of 
crackdowns on gun carrying, though these tests were not all independent and none 
employed a randomized design. We did not find any eligible studies examining other 
strategies for reducing gun possession and carrying such as monitoring of 
probationers and parolees, use of weapon reporting hotlines, and use of gun 
detection devices. 
 
With one exception, the included studies suggest that directed patrols focused on 
illegal gun carrying reduce gun violence at high-risk places and times. Inferences are 
limited, however, by the small number of available trials, variability in study design 
and analytical strategy, and the absence of randomized trials. As discussed in 
Sections 6.1and 6.2, we can only make very informal and tentative assessments of 
effect sizes across studies. Further, our narrative synthesis of the studies suggests 
that, despite careful efforts by the studies’ authors, strong conclusions cannot be 
drawn due to ambiguities in the evidence and confounding factors that have received 
limited attention. The results of these trials are very promising, but they are more 
likely to overestimate than underestimate the effects of directed patrols on gun 
crime. Below, we highlight some key limitations to the evidence, review a number of 
issues that deserve further attention, and conclude by suggesting directions for 
future research. 
 
7.2  METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
Results from these studies should be qualified based on the absence of randomized 
trials. Results of non-randomized studies often differ systematically from results of 
randomized trials (e.g., see Deeks et al. 2003), and non-randomized studies of 
criminal justice interventions in particular are more likely than randomized trials to 
find favorable results (Weisburd et al. 2001). 
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Despite the lack of randomized experiments, all of the studies employed relatively 
rigorous quasi-experimental designs. Each of the American studies employed a 
multiple interrupted time series design, which is generally regarded as one of the 
strongest non-randomized designs (Campbell and Stanley 1966), and the Colombian 
studies employed a variation of the equivalent time samples design. However, the 
studies had notable weaknesses in their application of these designs. In the 
American studies, the time series were relatively short. Only the Kansas City study 
had a full year of both pre-intervention and post-intervention data to control for 
seasonal effects, and the Pittsburgh analysis was complicated by a particularly short 
time series. The gun carrying bans in the Colombian studies were applied fairly 
regularly and predictably rather than randomly, as is optimal for an equivalent time 
samples design. 
 
Comparisons between intervention and comparison groups (i.e., areas and times) in 
these studies are also problematic. The intervention areas were chosen for their high 
and often rising levels of gun crime–levels that were often substantially higher than 
those in the comparison areas. This makes it likely that gun crimes in the 
intervention areas would have fallen or followed otherwise different trends from 
those in the comparison areas, even in the absence of the intervention. In other 
words, it is unlikely that the interventions were the only important difference 
between the intervention and comparison conditions, thus undermining the internal 
validity of the studies. 
 
7.3  EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
Findings from these studies may not be widely generalizable. Outcomes included in 
this review are mostly from trials conducted in the United States. The results may 
not apply to other countries with different crime problems, gun laws, and systems of 
justice. Further, all of the trials were conducted in high-crime urban areas and at 
high-crime times. Even if directed patrols do reduce crime under those conditions, 
they may not reduce crime in places or at times with lower levels of crime. The long-
term effects of this strategy are also unknown. 
 
7.4  IMPLEMENTATION AND INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES 
As discussed in section 6.2, it is difficult to make generalizations about the effects of 
dosage and implementation from these studies. A related caveat is that the studies 
did not directly measure changes in gun carrying, which is the presumed mechanism 
through which the patrols reduced gun crime. For example, they did not examine 
changes in the number of gun seizures per traffic and pedestrian stop during the 
interventions, nor did they measure gun carrying using other methods (e.g., offender 
surveys). Although the inferred link between gun carrying and gun crime has a 
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strong theoretical basis, documenting changes in gun carrying more explicitly would 
strengthen the evidentiary links between gun patrols, gun carrying, and gun crime. 
 
7.5  CRIME DISPLACEMENT 
The included studies did not consistently address crime displacement in its various 
manifestations (for an extended discussion of displacement and its varieties, see 
Barr and Pease 1990). The included studies provide limited evidence of crime 
displacement to nearby areas that was statistically insignificant and not sufficient to 
offset declines in the target areas. It is difficult, of course, to completely rule out 
displacement to areas not adjacent to the target areas because the number of crimes 
that may be displaced in these types of studies is typically small enough to be lost in 
the normal variability of crime at the city level. However, crime tends to be 
concentrated at places and times that bring together motivated offenders, suitable 
targets, and an absence of capable guardians (Cohen and Felson 1979; also see 
Sherman et al. 1989). To the extent that crime is displaced, therefore, it may move to 
areas having a similar constellation of these features. Such areas are often in close 
proximity. 
 
Short-term temporal displacement (e.g., displacement to different times of day or 
different days of the week) was a potential if not documented problem in the 
Pittsburgh and Colombian studies. Displacement to crimes without firearms did not 
appear to occur in Indianapolis north, Cali, or Bogota (it was not addressed 
elsewhere). 
 
7.6  FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Subject to the caveats we have noted, a small number of non-randomized, quasi-
experiments suggest that directed patrols focused on illegal gun carrying prevent 
gun crimes.39
                                                        
39 Our overall conclusions are similar to those of others that have reviewed subsets of the literature 
discussed here (NRC 2005; Sherman and Eck 2002). 
 Future studies could improve on prior research and answer some of 
the questions raised above by using better and more control groups, by controlling 
for confounding variables through randomization, and by carefully measuring 
variables related to context and program implementation (e.g. officer hours, 
pedestrian stops, gun seizures, and complementary activities such as 
probation/parole checks) (Mayo-Wilson 2007) and by reporting a standardized set 
of outcomes in order to facilitate synthesis. Multi-site randomized trials using 
numerous patrol beats from several cities, as Sherman (1997) has advocated, appear 
justified for this strategy. Barring such ambitious efforts, it might be feasible to 
rotate gun patrol crackdowns at random intervals across a number of high-crime 
areas in a single city over an extended period (Sherman 1990). Evaluators could 
improve evidence obtained from all trials, randomized or not, by devoting more 
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formal attention to long-term differences in crime levels and trends between target 
and intervention areas and by collecting implementation and outcome measures like 
those used in previous studies to facilitate comparisons across studies. 
 
Even randomized controlled trials, however, will not answer all of the outstanding 
questions about directed patrols. Studies of offenders (using official records and/or 
surveys) might tell researchers more about the characteristics of people who illegally 
carry weapons in gun crime hot spots, including their prior and current offending 
patterns, areas of residence, and dispositions, all of which could yield useful data 
about deterrence, incapacitation, displacement, and diffusion effects associated with 
gun patrols. Such information might also provide insights into how gun patrols 
could be better structured to reduce crime. As we have discussed elsewhere (Koper 
and Mayo-Wilson 2006), this strategy of attacking gun crime also raises potential 
concerns about legality, racial profiling, community relations, and cost effectiveness 
(e.g., see Gau and Brunson 2010; McGarrell et al. 2000; NRC 2004). The studies 
reviewed here suggest that programs of this sort can be implemented cost effectively 
(McGarrell et al. 2000) and without harming police-community relations 
(McGarrell et al. 2000; Shaw 1995), but these issues warrant continued assessment. 
For example, qualitative research involving community members, offenders arrested 
in crackdowns, and other stakeholders could be included in future studies to 
highlight strategies that individuals living in violent communities believe will reduce 
crime without harming or alienating the communities meant to benefit. 
 
Finally, there is also a strong need for rigorous research on other police 
interventions to reduce illegal possession and carrying of firearms. A recent survey 
of U.S. police agencies serving large cities, for example, shows that the majority 
make regular or occasional use of several such strategies, including enhanced 
monitoring of probationers and parolees, weapon reporting hotlines, consent 
searches at the homes of high-risk juveniles, and checks on gun ownership by people 
under restraining orders (Koper et al. 2012). However, our review revealed no 
rigorous studies (and few of any sort) focusing on these strategies.40
 
 
Police interventions are, of course, a limited response to gun violence, and they do 
not address many of the underlying social conditions that contribute to crime and 
violence. Yet there is evidence that directed patrols may help break the cycle of gun 
violence in troubled communities and establish the conditions necessary for long-
term improvements. To use a medical analogy, one must stop the bleeding before 
one can heal the patient. 
 
                                                        
40 Although there have been a number of studies examining strategies to reduce gun crime by targeting 
high-risk probationers and parolees, they have generally featured threats of federal prosecution and 
offers of social services as key means to reduce gun crime among these groups (e.g., Braga et al. 2001; 
Chermak 2006; McGarrell et al. 2006; Papachristos et al. 2007), which made them ineligible for this 
review. Other research with probationers and parolees has not been sufficiently rigorous to meet the 
methodological requirements for this review. 
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